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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a privilege to comment on the paper of Robert Casad, who 
probably has done more than any other American to reveal the 
mysteries of jurisdiction to those who must understand that 
complicated body of law or suffer its consequences.1 Professor 
Casad's capacity to explain complicated doctrine to Americans made 
him the logical choice to do the same in this international gathering. 
He has performed the work with clarity and grace, covering a great 
deal of territory and, as well, charting a course for the future. 
Of course, that leaves little room for commentary, at least if the 
commentator is not bent on pressing pet theories or fighting old 
battles. I will try to resist those urges and to view Professor Casad's 
paper as an opportunity for comparative reflection in both the 
retrospective and prospective dimensions that occupy his attention. 
My thinking on these matters has been shaped by teaching and writing 
on issues of international civil litigation in United States courts/ and 
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania. 
I profited from the comments of Linda Silberman on a draft. 
I. See Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at the End of the Twentieth 
Century, Fomm Conveniens and Fomm Nun Conveniens, 7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91 (1999); 
ROBERT C. CASAD, JURlSDICTION IN CNIL ACTIONS (2d ed. 1991 ). 
2. See, e.g, Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for 
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Summer 1994). 
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by my participation in a study group formed to advise the United 
States delegation to the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law in connection with the current project to fashion a treaty on the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments.3 That project 
contemplates a product that will at least be a "convention double," 
prescribing rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments as 
well as both required and prohibited grounds for the assertion of 
jurisdiction to adjudicate.4 It may also contain a third category of 
jurisdictional grounds that are neither required nor prohibited and thus 
become a "convention mixte. "5 
I I. JURJSDICTION TO ADJUDICATE IN HISTORJCAL AND COMPARATIVE 
CONTEXT 
A. The Relationship Between State and Federal Law 
It probably bears more emphasis than Professor Casad's paper 
provides that the primary source of authority for jurisdiction to 
adjudicate in state courts, which conduct the vast majority of judicial 
business in the United States, is state law. This is a point easily 
forgotten by Americans, and I assume that it may not be noticed by 
those from other countries. It is easily forgotten here because law 
school courses tend to focus, as Professor Casad's paper focuses, on 
federal constitutional limitations on the exercise of state court 
jurisdiction.6 Such emphasis could be explained as a concession to 
the shortness of life, since in one sense federal limitations impart 
uniformity to the area and make it possible, in that sense, to speak of 
the "American law of jurisdiction to adjudicate."7 For many years, 
and perhaps still today, it could also be explained in part by the utility 
function of law professors:8 the desire of most of us to teach at least 
3. See CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION 
OF MARCH 1998 ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN 
CIY1L AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9 (1998) [hereinafter 
PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9]; CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE 
SPECIAL COM!VIISSION OF JUNE 1997 ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8 
( 1997) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8). 
4. See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENI No. 8, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
5. See id; see also Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments. A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27i, 272, 
282-84 (Summer 1994 ) . 
6. See, e.g, RlCHARD H. FIELD et. a!., CIVIL PROCEDURE 923-1083 (7th ed. 1997). 
7. Such emphasis is also consistent w ith the use of a federal model in the basic course in 
Civil Procedure, particularly given the choice made to borrow jurisdictional standards in most 
federal civil1itigation from state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)( I )(A). 
8. See RlCHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-44 ( 1995). 
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some constitutional law.9 In any event, it can be justified on more 
practical grounds, to the extent that, explicitly or in fact, states have 
tied their jurisdictional law to developing federal constitutional 
standards.10 
The tendency to elide state law and federal constitutional law 
concerning jurisdiction to adjudicate-what I will call linkage-is not 
without costs, domestically and internationally. Domestically, it may 
encourage a race to the bottom, as state lawmakers consider either the 
interests of their residents or the interests of their lawyers in securing 
access to a local forum and do not want either to suffer competitive 
disadvantage. 11 When this happens, state law suffers. 
Thinking about the matter in this way brings into view a second 
potential cost of linkage, which is opposed to the first and has broader 
jurisprudential roots and implications. Due process has both 
procedural and substantive dimensions. Both of them implicate the 
proper role of the judiciary in constraining state (and federal) law, and 
it is not easy to locate the law of personal jurisdiction exclusively in 
either.12 During the procedural "due process explosion"13 of the 
1970s, many Americans came to think and talk about due process as 
marking not "the least possible good"14 one could say about a law, but 
rather that which should be afforded as a normative matter. When this 
happens, both state law and federal constitutional law may suffer. 15 
Whether or not it is helpful to think about developments in 
constitutional law affecting personal jurisdiction in terms of the 
9. See id at 87. 
10. See Casad, supra note 1, at 1 04; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 
639 n.14 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
11. "States have little incentive to limit rules such as transient jurisdiction that make it 
easier for their own citizens to sue out-of-state defendants." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 n.14 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original). 
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which involved personal 
jurisdiction, may have initiated the modem debate on the Supreme Court about the proper role of 
the judiciary in interpreting the constitutional command. See id. at 323-26 (separate opinion of 
Black, J.). That debate, which is more famously associated with issues like abortion, see Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973 ), continued in connection with procedural due process, see Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272-279 ( 1970) (Black, J., dissenting), as it did in the jurisdictional 
context. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622-27 (opinion of Scalia, J.); id at 633-37 (opinion of 
Brennan, J.). In addition, the Court in International Shoe drew on procedural due process cases. 
See infra text accompanying note 30. 
13. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1975). 
14. "To say that a law does not violate the due process clause is to say the least possible 
good about it." Elliott E. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws.· Some Developments and Some Questions, 
25 ARK. L. REv. 9, 25 (1971). 
15. Cf William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the 
United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 456-62 (1998) (discussing remedies and 
"judicialization"); infra text accompanying note 42 (linkage hinders comparative perspective). 
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procedural due process revolution, that revolution is long over, 16 and 
the third and most obvious cost of linkage has been incurred. Both 
the changing contours of due process and its fact dependency have 
exacerbated the uncertainty of state jurisdictional standards founded 
in federal constitutional limitations.17 
Internationally, this American phenomenon of linkage might 
have augured significant advantages, if it had yielded a relatively 
determinate "American law." Instead, however, it has imposed 
substantial costs as a result both of the uncertainty of jurisdictional 
standards tied to changing (but ever fact-dependent) constitutional 
norms and of the inevitably exorbitant18 appearance of jurisdictional 
law that started as a floor and became a bed. 
The same phenomenon may be in part responsible for difficulties 
Americans have experienced in attempting to explain American law 
to their colleagues abroad, including at The Hague. This is not to say 
that, for instance, Europeans would accept all of the jurisdictional 
bases set forth in a typical state long-arm statute of the elaborating 
type (that is, one that does not simply refer to and incorporate federal 
constitutional standards).19 Starting at that level, however, not only 
would be sounder as a jurisprudential matter, but would also provide 
more hope of shared understanding than starting and ending with the 
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States.20 
Proceeding as I suggest might be misleading if anyone believed 
as a result that the chosen "American" model was typical. That would 
be a risk if the comparative project were descriptive. It should not be 
a risk in a project whose aim is a treaty, such as the current project at 
The Hague. Indeed, the perspective taken here could be of value not 
only in educating our colleagues abroad about American law but also 
in educating ourselves. 
In the process of reaching compromises with delegates from 
other countries, the American delegates would do well to remember 
that due process is a floor and, thus, that there is room to live above it. 
16. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Jeny L. Mashaw, The 
Supreme Courts Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: 
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cl-n. L. REv. 28 (1976). 
1 7. See Casad, supra note 1, at 7, 10. 
! 8. For a discussion of exorbitant fora in connection with current deliberations at The 
Hague, see PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8, supra note 3, at 59-63 and Annex V I. 
19. See, e.g, UNIF. INTERSTATE AND lNT'L PROC. ACT§ 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361-62 (1986) 
(personal jurisdiction based on conduct). 
20. Cf Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law. Sources of Authority and Sources 
of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1551, 1575-76 (1992) (uniform state judgments recognition and 
enforcement legislation prompted by difficulties encountered in other countries accustomed to 
codified law). 
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They might also find it easier to accept that, when one views the 
United States as the relevant territory, there is no need to insist on the 
availability of every basis of jurisdiction to adjudicate found in the 
law of the fifty states and/or found not to violate due process, and 
conversely, no need to resist a single basis that might violate due 
process if asserted by a state court.21 If the time comes to consider 
whether to adopt compromises made at The Hague as federal law, the 
same perspective should ease the burdens of those concerned about 
either the legal or the political problems of federalism. 22 
B. Tag Jurisdiction 
Professor Casad's paper well describes both the historical 
importance of physical presence in the development of American 
ideas about jurisdiction to adjudicate and the current constitutional 
law regarding it.23 International and comparative perspectives on that 
subject permit me to explore further the problems and opportunities 
afforded by the interplay of state and federal law. In addition, tag 
jurisdiction provides a test of the positive dimensions of Professor 
Casad's claims concerning the role of interest balancing in the 
application of constitutional norms.24 
1. International and Comparative Perspectives 
In previous work I have noted the irony that, although the 
foundations of American constitutional law concerning personal 
jurisdiction were thought to lie in public international law, the 
cornerstone of the foundation, physical presence in the state at the 
time process is served, is no longer an acceptable basis for the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction internationally. 25 11oreover, 
although Professor Casad is correct to mention the division on the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the Burnham case/6 we agree 
21. Cf FED. R. C!v. P. 4(1<)(2) (authorizing exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the 
Constitution in federal question case where defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of general jurisdiction of any state). 
22. See Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. 
REv. 1161, 1174-75 (1998). For an example of the use of federal legislative power to override 
state (personal and subject matter) jurisdictional law, see 28 U.S. C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994) (foreign 
sovereign immunity). 
23. See Casad, supra note I, at 98, I 07 
24. See id at I 04. 
25. See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1468 
n.66 (1991) (book review). 
26. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 ( 1990); see also Casad, supra note I ,  at 
103. 
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the important role that it once played in mitigating the rigors of a 
territorial system highly protective of defendants when travel was 
difficult and expensive, and thus serving the interests of plaintiffs and 
states. 38 In that regard, tag jurisdiction is a species of general 
jurisdiction, and thus does not require any connection between the 
defendant's contacts in the state and the plaintiff's claims.39 
When one considers another basis of general jurisdiction, namely 
domicile/state of incorporation,40 it is apparent that such bases are not 
immune to "interest balancing" as a means of justifying a 
contemporary conclusion that an assertion of jurisdiction is not 
fundamentally unfair. The states of the United States have a shared 
interest in providing at least one place where a person or corporation 
can be sued-a jurisdictional "headquarters"41-an interest that is 
shared by plaintiffs. In light of these interests, a person or corporation 
that has purposefully established such a relationship with a state 
cannot properly complain that an assertion of jurisdiction is so unfair 
as to be unconstitutional. 
This suggests that another cost for federal constitutional law of 
the linkage we see today lies in the loss of comparative perspective 
that may occur when due process is formulated knowing that it will 
serve as the source of rules for state law. Otherwise, due process 
might serve "as an instrument of interstate federalism"42 by taking 
account dynamically of the adjudicatory jurisdictional landscape 
within the United States as a whole, adjusting the constitutional floor 
when new grounds became available that diminished the need for 
others and hence altered the balance of interests broadly viewed. That 
is one way to understand the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. 
Heitner,43 and understanding it that way makes Burnham no less 
difficult to reconcile. 44 
38. See Weinstein, supra note 29, at 53-54. Note that similar reasoning can be used to 
justify the use of tag jurisdiction in exceptional cases even today. See Koh, supra note 33, at 145. 
39. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("a suit unrelated to his activities 
in the State"). 
40. See, e.g, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
41. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914) ("technically preeminent 
headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that 
have been attached to it by the law may be determined"); see Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate. A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1137, 1179 
(1966). 
42. 
43. 
44. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
Accordingly, in its day, and as part and parcel of an entire jurisdictional system, a rule 
that in-state service was sufficient may well have been "reasonable, in the context of 
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This way of looking at jurisdiction to adjudicate may also be 
helpful to our delegates at The Hague. It appears that delegates from 
other countries have had difficulty accepting the basis of asserting 
general jurisdiction to adjudicate that we call "doing business."45 It is 
probably too late in the day for an assertion of jurisdiction on this 
basis in a state where the defendant conducts substantial business 
systematically and continuously to be held unconstitutional.46 Yet, the 
advent of aggressive forms of specific jurisdiction, coupled with the 
headquarters basis of general jurisdiction, should cause one who 
believes in interest balancing and in due process "as an instrument of 
interstate federalism"47 in the sense used above, to pause over that 
question. So perhaps should its origins in a fiction that is tied to 
territorial notions of presence.48 In any event, the domestic 
comparative approach should help American delegates not to insist on 
this ground internationally, at least if other bases brought into focus 
by that approach are essentially preserved. Surrender should be even 
easier if it is proposed to include more limited forms of "doing 
business" jurisdiction, such as those that favor consumers.49 
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
Professor Casad points out that " [  c ]ontinental European 
countries generally reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens."50 
Their reaction is due in part to the theoretical difficulty he notes of a 
court that has competence or jurisdiction and is refusing to exercise 
our federal system of government." But now that the restrictive service of process 
requirement has been replaced with the more flexible "minimum contacts" test, the 
overbroad rule of sufficiency may no longer be fair and proper. More significantly, a 
due process standard that focuses on the historical existence of a single rule, isolated 
from the web of other rules in which it functioned is questionable, to say the least. 
Weinstein, supra note 29, at 54 (footnotes omitted). 
45. See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8, supra note 3, at 63; id. at Annex V I; 
PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9, supra note 3, at 30. 
46. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
But see Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.l (opinion of Scalia, J.) (suggesting that, as a constitutional 
matter, general jurisdiction on the basis of doing business may be restricted to corporations). 
4 7. Supra text accompanying note 42. 
48. "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the 
absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner as to warrant the 
inference that it is present there." Philadelphia & Reading Railway v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 
265 ( 1917); see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 ( 1945). 
49. See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 8, supra note 3, at 41-43; see also PERMANENT 
BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OUT 
LINE TO ASSIST IN THE PREPARATION OF A CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AJ\,'0 THE 
EFFECTS OF fOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, INFORMATION DOCUMENT 
No. 2, at 13 (Sept. 1998) (Article 7-Contracts with Consumers). 
50. Casad, supra note I, at I 06 footnote omitted). 
120 TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 7 
it. 51 In part it is also due to another related theoretical difficulty, 
namely, doctrine that expressly vests enormous discretion in the 
court. 52 A third basis for rejection, I suspect, is the lack of perceived 
need for such an equilibrating device in systems whose rules of 
jurisdiction to adjudicate are relatively determinate and also relatively 
conservative vis a vis defendants/3 as are the rules in the Brussels54 
and Lugano55 Conventions. 
Although forum non conveniens can be traced back a long way 
in Scots law, it has a short history in American courts outside of 
admiralty and maritime cases. 56 Moreover, the jurisprudential puzzle 
that dismays our European colleagues is no less puzzling here, at least 
when one considers the federal courts. That may explain why, in 
rationalizing and limiting the power of the federal courts to dismiss 
cases by abstaining in favor of state courts in the Quackenbush case, 
the Supreme Court recognized, but did not seek to justify, forum non 
conveniens as discrete.57 Of course, the discretionary nature of the 
doctrine is not otherwise problematic in most American courts, and 
there is widely recognized need for the relief it provides in states 
whose rules are neither determinate nor conservative. 58 
Professor Casad identifies and explores a potential anomaly 
created by supposed convergence between the factors that a court 
considers in determining whether to dismiss under forum non 
conveniens and the factors "that must be examined under the 
International Shoe doctrine to see whether the court has 
jurisdiction."59 He finds it "hard to visualize a case where the balance 
51. See id. 
52. See Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments 
Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1299-1300 (1998); Wendy Kennett, Forum Non 
Conveniens in Europe, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 552, 559-61 ( 1995); Burbank, supra note 25, at 1464-
65. 
53. See Zekoll, supra note 52, at 1297-1300. 
54. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, as amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1. For the 
subsequent history of the Brussels Convention, see von Mehren, supra note 5, at 275. 
55. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319). See von Mehren, supra note 5, at 275-
76. 
56. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access 
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 795-812 (1985). 
57. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721-23 (1996); Stephen B. 
Burbank, The United States' Approach to International Civil Litigation: Recent Developments in 
Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. lNT'LECON. L. 1, 17 (1998). 
58. See, eg, Zekoll, supra note 52, at 1298-99. 
59. Casad, supra note I, at 105; see Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State 
Corporation Commission, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) ("Such factors have been given great weight 
in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens."). 
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of interests makes the forum fundamentally fair, but where the forum 
is seriously inconvenient and the balance is so strongly in favor of the 
defendant that the plaintiff's forum choice should be rejected."60 He 
also seems to suggest that the anomaly does not arise very often, 
because "the doctrine of forum non conveniens is essentially limited 
to cases where the defendant's forum contacts are so substantial as to 
permit jurisdiction there for any cause of action, no matter where it 
arose,"61 in other words, cases involving general jurisdiction. 
Assuming for purposes of discussion that the factors are the 
same, the supposed anomaly exists only if one thinks about "the 
International Shoe doctrine" as designed to determine "whether the 
court has jurisdiction" and thinks about interest balancing as designed 
to determine whether "the forum [is] fundamentally fair." It does not 
exist if one views the role of federal law as checking assertions of 
jurisdiction that are fundamentally unfair62 and recalls that the source 
of authority for the forum non conveniens doctrine applied in state 
courts is state law. 63 
Even taking the view of International Shoe that Professor Casad 
adopts, the anomaly may not have been presented very often if the 
lower courts followed the lead of the Supreme Court. After the Court 
renewed its attention to the constitutional limitations on state court 
jurisdiction in 1977 and until recently, there was very little evidence 
of actual interest balancing in the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
Instead, the continuing influence of territoriality gave references to 
interests, as opposed to contacts, the quality of lip service. 64 
It may be that Professor Casad is correct in his empirical 
assertion that forum non conveniens is "essentially limited to cases" 
of general jurisdiction. 65 But if, as he contends, interest balancing is 
or should be part of the constitutional analysis of general jurisdiction 
as it is of specific jurisdiction,66 one would expect to encounter the 
same anomaly. This may suggest either that the supposed 
convergence of factors does not exist or that interest balancing has no 
role, or a different role, to play in connection with general 
jurisdiction. Both may be true. 
60. See Casad, supra note I, at I 05. 
61. !d. 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16. 
63. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994) (admiralty). 
64. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-16 ( 1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 
436 U.S. 84,92 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
65 See Casad, supra note I, at I 05. 
66. See id. at I 05-06. 
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Although interest balancing is part of the contemporary 
American approach to both forum non conveniens and constitutional 
limitations on state court jurisdiction, it may be important to refine 
Professor Casad's assertion that the same factors are weighed in the 
balance. The forum non conveniens analysis is, or at least is 
supposed to be, far more particularistic in connection with both 
private interests and public interests, 67 and if it is not, it is probably a 
mask for choice of law. 68 
I suggested above that, notwithstanding Justice Brennan's 
opinion in Burnham, interest balancing cannot save most assertions of 
tag jurisdiction,69 but I argued that it could be used to justify 
domicile/place of incorporation. 70 The interest balancing I employed 
was, like the ground of jurisdiction, categorical. The other ground of 
general jurisdiction discussed above, doing business, occupies 
intermediate territory, which is to say that, even assuming substantial 
defendant activity that is systematic and continuous, it is not clearly 
immune to constitutional attack on the basis of categorical, ex ante 
interest balancing. If ex post the courts make no effort to consider 
interests other than those suggested by the defendant's activities in the 
forum, forum non conveniens serves as a critically important 
equilibrating device. 
Given the theoretical problems that forum non conveniens poses 
for continental European systems, it is no surprise that the American 
delegates to The Hague have encountered resistance to the notion that 
the doctrine be a recognized feature of any treaty concluded. 71 
Certainly, the existence of those problems must mean that no 
signatory state should be required to apply the doctrine in its courts. 
Beyond that, it would seem advantageous to all signatory states that a 
convention which is likely to be more adventurous than the Brussels 
and Lugano Conventions accommodate such a safety valve in those 
states whose legal traditions permit it. I am assuming a requirement 
that there be an alternative forum available in another signatory state72 
and that, as a result of its location in another signatory state, no 
inquiry concerning its adequacy would be permitted. 73 To the extent 
67. See, e.g, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
68. See Stein, supra note 56, at 831-40. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
71. See PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 9, supra note 3, at 42-44. 
72. Compare Kennett's suggestion for a modified version of forum non conveniens under 
the Brussels Convention, whereby it "would not operate in cases where the plaintiff was 
domiciled in a Contracting State." Kennett, supra note 52, at 568-69. 
73. 
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that even that departure from the model of a "convention double" 
proved controversial, the American delegates might have an easier 
time in negotiations if they were willing to accept in return the 
Brussels Convention approach to lis pendens. 74 
IV. -CONCLUSION 
Professor Casad is correct that many courts, including the court 
that decided it, and many commentators, have misinterpreted 
International Shoe,75 and his suggested analytical approach seems to 
me more faithful to that case and to due process jurisprudence than 
the bifurcated approach taken in both of the two main opinions in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,76 let alone the lip service 
given to interests (other than those suggested by the defendant's 
contacts) in so many decisions before Asahi. 77 
These comments reflect my sense that, both domestically and 
internationally, that may be the wrong project. Resting on a floor that 
moves, and consisting in many rooms of nothing but that floor, the 
American house of jurisdiction to adjudicate is not a place where any 
sensible person other than a lawyer (if that is not redundant) wants to 
live. It is time to renovate the rooms, and in doing so, we may profit 
greatly from the fact that some of the revised design may be required, 
and that all of it can be influenced, by a collaborative international 
architectural project. 
The Brussels and Lugano Conventions do not permit the dismissal of actions on 
grounds of forum nonconveniens. The Conventions thus mirror the prevailing opinion 
in most civil law nations that the plaintiff's choice of a particular forum should not be 
disturbed as long as a jurisdictional rule permits this choice. This solution is seen as 
providing legal certainty and avoiding costly, and potentially offensive, litigation over 
the adequacy of the courts involved. 
Zekoll, supra note 52, at 1297 (footnotes omitted). 
74. In the event of duplicative litigation, Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, supra 
note 54, requires that "any court other than the court first seized shall of its own motion stay
-
its 
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established," and when it 
is established, "shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court." See PRELIMINARY DocUMENT 
No. 9, supra note 3, at 44. On lis pendens in federal courts, see Burbank, supra note 57, at 14-17. 
7 5. See Casad, supra note I, at I 07-08. 
76. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987); id at 
116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Casad, supra note 
I, at 108-09. 
77. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
